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COMMENTS
unemployment compensation cases. These future cases are likely
to be highly influential in determining whether the program will
be successful in Louisiana. It must be remembered that the very
foundation for unemployment compensation is the theory that
a fund can be built up during "good times" in order to pay
benefits during "bad times." It is significant that the program
has never been put to a severe test, although there have been a
few minor recessions. Nevertheless, a few states found them-
selves in difficulty during the relatively short recession of 1958,
even though there had been a long period of prosperity before
that time.129 Hence it behooves the Louisiana agency, admin-
istrative tribunals, and courts to do their part in protecting
the rights of future claimants to benefits during severe economic
conditions through a diligent application of the safeguards em-
bodied in the statute, while at the same time giving the statute a
fair interpretation assuring benefits to those who presently have
a lawful right to them according to the terms of the statute.
J. C. Parkerson
State Taxation of Private Interests in
Federally Owned Property
The framers of the American Constitution viewed their
handiwork as a union of sovereign states under a sovereign fed-
eral government.' Conceptually, the former are governments of
broad reserved powers, while the latter is one of delegated,
enumerated powers. 2 Although each of these governments is
supreme in its sphere of authority,3 the limits of these spheres
129. This information was taken from a statement made by R. C. Goodwin,
Director of the Federal Bureau of Employment Security, which was reported by
the Associated Press and published in the Baton Rouge Morning Advocate of
November 11, 1958. "Michigan had to borrow $113 million from the federal gov-
ernment to take care of its fund requirements. Reserves of several other states-
including Pennsylvania, Oregon, Delaware, Rhode Island, and West Virginia-
have dwindled to a point where they too may need federal loans."
1. U.S. CONST. art. VI, par. 2; U.S. CoNsT. amend. IX-X, TnE FEDuEAuST
Nos. 32 (Hamilton), 33 (Hamilton), 36 (Hamilton), 45 (Madison), and 46
(Madison).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. X: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people."
3. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
1959]
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iii some areas are not clearly defined. Within this framework of
dual sovereignty federal and state powers are frequently in con-
flict. The clash is acute in the field of taxation. State taxes fre-
quently are levied upon subjects in which the federal government
has a governmental interest. Federal taxes, similarly, sometimes
strike near to state governmental operations. Although the con-
stitutional problems in either situation are fundamentally alike,
attention here will be directed only to taxes by states and their
subdivisions.
The power of taxation reserved to the states is extensive, but
it does not extend to the means, that is, agencies, activities, and
property, employed by the federal government to execute the
powers conferred upon it by the people.4 This is the doctrine of
implied immunity of federal instrumentalities from state tax-
ation, a principle firmly woven into the fabric of federal con-
stitutional law.
Chief Justice Marshall is credited with the first judicial pro-
nouncement of the doctrine of implied immunity in McCulloch v.
Maryland' in 1819. A Maryland state tax on notes issued by the
Second Bank of the United States, an instrumentality of the
United States, was held unconstitutional as an encroachment
upon federal sovereignty. Since that decision the Supreme Court
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. Const. Art. VI, par. 2.
1 "The sovereignty of a State extends to every thing which exists by its own
authority, or is introduced by its permission. . . . If we measure the power of
taxation residing in a State, by the extent of sovereignty which the people of a
single State possess, and can confer on its government, we have an intelligible
standard, applicable to every case to which the power may be applied. We have
a principle which leaves the power of taxing the people and property of a State
unimpaired . . . and which places beyond its reach, all those powers which are
conferred by the people of the United States on the government of the Union, and
all those means which are given for the purpose of carrying those powers into
execution. We have a principle which is safe for the States, and safe for the
Union. We are relieved, as we ought to be, from clashing sovereignty; from inter-
fering powers*; from a repugnancy between a right in one government to pull down
what there is an acknowledged right in another to build up;' from the incompati-
bility of a right in one government to destroy what there is a right in another to
preserve." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 429-430 (1819).
4. "The sovereignty of a State extends to every thing which exists by its own
authority, or is introduced by its permission; but does it extend to those means
which are employed by Congress to carry into execution powers conferred on that
body by the people of the United States? We think it demonstrable that it does
not. . . . The Court has bestowed on this subject its most deliberate consideration.
The result is a conviction that the States have no power, by taxation or otherwise,
to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the consti-
tutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in
the general government. This is, we think, the unavoidable consequence of that
supremacy which the constitution has declared." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4. Wheat.) 316, 429, 436 (1819).
5: See notes 3 and 4 supra.
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has considered a panoramic variety of tax immunity cases with
seemingly changeable and inconsistent results," but it has re-
iterated Chief Justice Marshall's pronouncement with unbroken
consistency.7 While the formulation of the principle is clear and
unquestioned, its full import and proper application in particular
cases may be quite debatable.8 Opinions about which taxes trans-
gress the bounds of federal immunity change with time and
taxing techniques. "Looking backward it is easy to see that the
line between the taxable and the immune has been drawn by an
unsteady hand."9
It seems that no adequate test for determining whether a
given tax violates implied governmental immunity can be de-
rived from the judicial decisions, for decisions have varied with
the kinds of taxes,'0 their objects or subjects," and the legal
relationships involved.1 2 When state taxes have been found to be
6. Powell, The Waning of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 58 HARV. L.
REV. 633 (1945) ; Powell, The Remnant of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 58
HARV. L. REV. 757 (1945); Rice & Estes, Sales and Use Taxes as Affected by
Federal Governmental Immunity, 9 VAND. L. REV. 204 (1956) ; Note, 14 LoUisi-
ANA LAW REVIEW 696 (1954) ; Note, 39 MINN. L. REV. 195 (1955).
7. See note 6 supra.
8. The lack of unanimity among the Justices in the cases involving the im-
munity doctrine illustrates this basic disagreement. For example, the Supreme
Court was closely divided in the following cases: Detroit v. Murray Corp., 355
U.S. 489 (1958), 54; United States v. Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958), 7-2, two of
the seven majority concurred; United States v. Township of Muskegon, 355 U.S.
484 (1958), 7-2; Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 (1954), 6-3;
S.R.A. Inc. v. Minnesota, 327 U.S. 558 (1946), two justices wrote concurring
opinions on this issue; United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944),
7-2; James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937), 5-4; Panhandle Oil
Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U.S. 218 (1928), 5-4; Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501
(1922), 6-3.
9. United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174, 176 (1944).
* 10. See Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 (1954) ; Esso Standard
Oil Co. v. Evans, 345 U.S. 495 (1953) ; United States v. Allegheny County, 322
U.S. 174 (1944) ; Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941) ; Helvering v.
Mountain Producers Corporation, 303 U.S. 376 (1938) ; James v. Dravo Contract-
ing Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937) ; Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393
(1932) ; Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U.S. 218 (1928) ; Gillespie v. Okla-
homa, 257 U.S. 501 (1922) ; Plummer v. Coler, 178 U.S. 115 (1900) ; Van
Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151 (1886).
11. See Detroit v. Murray Corporation, 355 U.S. 489 (1958) ; Werner Machine
Co. v. Director of Division of Taxation, 350 U.S. 492 (1956) ; S.R.A., Inc. v.
Minnesota, 327 U.S. 558 (1946); United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S.
174 (1944) ; Fox Film Corporation v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123 (1932) ; Willcuts v.
Bunn, 282 U.S. 216 (1931) ; Greiner v. Lewellyn, 258 U.S. 384 (1922) ; United
States v. Perkins, 163 U.S. 625 (1896) ; Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie County,
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 435 (1842) ; Weston v. Charleston, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449
(1829)...
12. Compare Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 (1954) ; Carson v.
Roane-Anderson Co., 342 U.S. 232 (1952) ; Standard Oil Company of California
v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481 (1942) ; Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941) ;
Curry v. United States, 314 U.S. 14 (1941) ; Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S.
514 (1926). 1
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levied upon federal property, instrumentalities, functions, and
activities, they have been struck down under the implied im-
munity doctrine, 13 but to make this finding has been often dif-
ficult. Confronted by this uncertainty about state taxing power
but strongly pressed by an increased need for revenue, states
have sought new subjects for taxation. To validate these efforts,
examined in the light of the implied immunity doctrine, finer,
more difficult distinctions among legal relationships are in-
evitable.14 Recognizing the serious need of the states and their
vital interest in taxation, the Supreme Court only reluctantly
invalidates state taxes, even though the levies have an impact
upon or affect matters in which there is a federal governmental
interest.
In its many decisions, from McCulloch v. Maryland to the
present, involving the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity
from taxation the Supreme Court has tried to avoid any im-
pairment of that doctrine or reticence in its application. The im-
munity of the State or Nation itself, its possessions, activities,
and institutions, has been sustained and emphasized. The more
difficult issues arise, however, when a delegated immunity is
claimed by those who deal economically with the government.
By virtue of their relationship in dealing with and performing
services for the federal government in its proper functions, its
immunity is claimed to extend, i.e., to be impliedly delegated, to
them.15 Nevertheless in increasingly numerous instances the im-
munity has been denied and the taxes sustained. What the court
has denied is tax immunity for the contractor's own property,
13. Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 (1954) ; Carson v. Roane-
Anderson Co., 342 U.S. 232 (1952) ; Pittman v. Home Owners' Loan Corporation,
308 U.S. 21 (1939) ; Graves v. Texas Company, 298 U.S. 393 (1936) ; City of
New Brunswick v. United States, 276 U.S. 547 (1928) ; Clallam County v. United
States, 263 U.S. 341 (1923) ; Owensboro National Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U.S.
664 (1899) ; McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). In con-
nection with Carson v. Roane-Anderson Co., supra, see 67 STAT. 575 (1953), 42
U.S.C. 1809.
14. "The application of the principle which denies validity to . . . a tax has
required the observing of close distinctions in order to maintain the essential free-
dom of government in performing its functions, without unduly limiting the taxing
power which is equally essential to both Nation and State under our dual system."
Chief Justice Hughes in James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 150
(1937).
15. Chief Justice Marshall having expounded the principle in McCulloch v.
Maryland that properties, functions, and instrumentalities of the Federal Govern-
ment are immune from state taxation, "[I]n the course of time [the Supreme
Court] held that even without explicit congressional action immunities had become
communicated to the income or property or transactions of others because they in
some manner dealt with or acted for the Government." United States v. Allegheny
County, 322 U.S. 174, 176 (1944).
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profits, or purchases, distinguishing between taxation of private
interests and taxation of governmental interests. This distinc-
tion, although it is sometimes difficult, is fundamental to the
sound application of the immunity doctrine. 16
The distinction between private and governmental interests
was invoked to invalidate a county tax assessment in 1944 in a
milestone decision by the Supreme Court, United States v. Al-
legheny County. 7 The Mesta Machine Company contracted with
the United States Government for the production of large field
guns. Valuable special machinery was furnished to Mesta by
the Government at a rental of one dollar under a leasing arrange-
ment. The machinery was bolted on concrete foundations in
Mesta's plant, but was to remain the property of the United
States. Allegheny County then revised Mesta's assessment for
ad valorem real property taxes to include the leased machinery.
The government had agreed to reimburse Mesta for state or local
taxes if Mesta was compelled to pay them. The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania upheld the assessment on the ground that it
was immaterial who held legal title, for the machinery consti-
tuted a part of the mill for purposes of assessment. It held that
the assessment was not against the United States but against
Mesta which was operating its mill for private purposes.' 8 Re-
versing the decision, the United States Supreme Court held that
the tax was imposed upon property owned by the United States,
and "that Government-owned property, to the full extent of the
Government's interest therein, is immune from taxation, either
as against the Government itself or as against one who holds it
as a bailee."'19 That Mesta had a beneficial interest in the prop-
erty was acknowledged. The state or county having made no
effort to segregate Mesta's interest and tax it, the court speci-
fically reserved opinion on the question whether a right of pos-
session and use could be taxed.20 Perhaps the willingness of the
16. Id. at 186.
17. Ibid.
18. Id. at 180.
19. Id. at 189.
20. "Mesta has some legal and beneficial interest in this property. It is a
bailee for mutual benefit. Whether such a right of possession and use in view of
all the circumstances could ,be taxed by appropriate proceedings we do not decide.
Its leasehold interest is subject to some qualification of the right to use the prop-
erty except for gun manufacture, is limited to the period it engages in such work,
and is perhaps burdened by other contractual conditions. We have held that where
private interests in property were so preponderant that all the Government held
was a naked title and a nominal interest, the whole value was taxable to the
equitable owner. . . . But that is not the situation here, and the State has made
no effort to segregate Mesta's interest and tax it. The full value of the property,
1959]
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Court to strike down this tax assessment stemmed from a desire
to avoid impediments to the existing war effort to which these
contractual arrangements were vital.
In 1947 the Supreme Court of California held that the i'pos-
sessory interests" in real property of a lessee of two United
States-owned shipyards was taxable as a species of property, an
estate for years.2 1 The taxpayer operated both shipyards pur-
suant to "Facilities Contracts" for their construction and "Vessel
Construction Contracts." Although the United States appeared
as intervener in the case, the decision was not appealed to the
United States Supreme Court. The decision was based upon a
California statute22 which provided for taxation of possessory
interests arising out of leases of tax-exempt real property. The
including the whole ownership interest, as well as whatever value proper appraisal
might attribute to the leasehold, was included in Mesta's assessment." Id. at 186.
187.
As early as 1819 the possibility of state taxation of private interests in federal
property or activities was suggested but not decided. At the end of his opinion in
Mculloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice Marshall stated: "This opinion does not
deprive the states of any resources which they originally possessed. It does not
extend to a tax paid by the real property of the bank, in common with the other
real property within the state, nor to a tax imposed on the interest which the
citizens of Maryland may hold in this institution, in common with other property
of the same description throughout the state. But this is a tax on the operations
of the bank, and is . . . unconstitutional." 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 435 (1819).
21. Kaiser Co. v. Reid, 30 Cal.2d 610 (1947).
22. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 104. "Real estate" and "real property." " 'Real
estate' or 'real property' includes:




§ 105. " 'Improvements.' 'Improvements' includes: (a) All buildings, structures,
fixtures, and fences erected on or affixed to the land, except telephone & telegraph
lines."
§ 107. " 'Possessory interests': As security for taxes: Leasehold estates in gas,
petroleum, etc. 'Possessory interests' means the following: (a) Possession of,
claim to, or right to the possession of land or improvements, except when coupled
with ownership of the land or improvements in the same person. (b) Taxable im-
provements on tax exempt land.
"Except as provided in this section, possessory interests shall not be considered
as sufficient security for the payment of any taxes .. "
The California statute was amended in 1957: § 107.1. (Added by Stats. 1957,
Ch. 2111, § 1).
"A possessory interest, when arising out of a lease of exempt property, consists
of the lessee's interest under such lease and is hereby declared to-be personal prop-
erty within the meaning of Section 14 of Art. XIII of the Constitution of the
State of California.
"The full cash value of such possessory interest is the excess, if any, of the
value of the lease on the open market, as determined by the formula contained in
the case of De Luz Homes, Inc. v. County of San Diego (1955), 45 Cal.2d 546,
over the present worth of the rentals under said lease for the unexpired term
thereof.
"A possessory interest taxable under the provisions of this section shall be
assessed to the lessee on the same basis or percentage of valuation employed as to
other tangible property on the same roll."
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court decided that the immunity doctrine furnished no justifica-
tion for exempting plaintiff's private possessory interest in the
shipyards from bearing its fair share of local taxes.28
It is a well-established proposition that Congress has power
to waive any implied immunity of federal property or relation-
ships from state or local taxation, 24 but an express waiver of
immunity avoids consideration of the narrow, basic question
whether a state may tax a lessee's or private user's interest in
federal property in the absence of congressional action. The Su-
preme Court squarely faced this crucial issue for the first time
in three decisions rendered on the same day in early 1958.
In the first of those cases 25 the United States Government
had entered into contracts with two manufacturers for the pro-
duction of airplanes, parts, and subassemblies for delivery to the
Air Force. Murray Corporation was a subcontractor for the de-
livery of airplane parts, subassemblies, and nondurable tools to
the prime contractors at fixed prices. The Air Force contract-
ing officer approved the subcontracts, which specified that title
23. Kaiser Co. v. Reid, 30 Cal.2d 610, 629 (1947). The California Supreme
Court recently held, however, that taxation of a contractor's possessory interest
or right to use personal property owned by the United States was invalid. It was
recognized that a private possessory interest in or right to use government-owned
personal property may be made the subject of a nondiscriminatory tax measured by
the value of the property used, even though the economic burden falls on the
United States. The statute providing for taxation of private interests in tax-
exempt property applied only to real property and the court considered the ques-
tion whether such a tax on possessory interests in tax-exempt personalty should
be adopted as one for legislative determination. General Dynamics Corporation
and Aerojet-General Corporation v. County of Los Angeles, 330 P.2d 794 (Cal.
1958).
24. Offutt Housing Company v. County of Sarpy, 351 U.S. 253 (1956). See
also United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944); Graves v. New
York, 306 U.S. 466 (1939). In Offutt Housing Co. v. County of Sarpy the Su-
preme Court sustained the application of Nebraska's "personal property" tax to a
builder-lessee's interest in a Wherry Military Housing Project. The lease provided
for construction of the housing project by the lessee and subsequent operation and
leasing by him of units to authorized Air Force personnel. This lease arrangement
was authorized by Acts of Congress, 61 STAT. 774, 5 U.S.C. § 626s-3 (1947), and
63 STAT. 570, 576 (1949). Section 6 of the former act provided that "the lessee's
interest, made or created pursuant to the provisions of this Act, shall be made sub-ject to State or local taxation." 61 STAT. 776, 5 U.S.C. § 626s-6 (1947). The New
Mexico Supreme Court followed the Offutt Housing Co. case in deciding Kirtland
Heights, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners of Bernalillo County, 326 P.2d
672 (N.M. 1958). Factually, the two cases are almost identical. An ad valorem
real property tax was levied in the Kirtland Heights case, but both cases arose
under the same congressional statutes and the same type of federal lease. The
impact of the Offutt Housing Co. and Kirtland Heights decisions upon the im-
munity principle is cushioned by two significant features: (1) the state taxes im-
posed upon the lessees' interests were ordinary personal and real property taxes;
and (2) Congress had specifically authorized taxation of lessees' interests in that
type of federal property, i.e., had waived any immunity that interest enjoyed. See
Van Allen v. TheAssessors, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 573, 585 (1865).
25. Detroit v. Murray Corporation, 355 U.S. 489 (1958).
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to all parts, materials, inventories, work in process, and non-
durable tools acquired or produced in performing the subcon-
tracts should vest in the government. The City of Detroit and
Wayne County, Michigan, each assessed Murray Corporation's
personal property for taxation.26 This assessment included in its
valuation materials acquired and work in process in respondent's
possession in performance of the subcontracts. The Supreme
Court held that the tax did not infringe the federal government's
constitutional immunity, since the tax was imposed upon the pos-
sessory interest in government property instead of the property
itself, even though (1) the tax was styled a "personal property
tax," and (2) the statute did not expressly tax the person in pos-
session for the privilege of possessing tax-exempt property.
In its analysis the court expressly assumed that the United
States had full title to the property.2 7 Although the taxes were
26. The following statutory provisions were involved in this case: 6 MIcH.
STAT. ANN. § 7.1: "Property subject to taxation. Section 1. . . . That all prop-
erty, real and personal, within the jurisdiction of this state, not expressly ex-
empted, shall be subject to taxation.
§ 7.10: "Annual Assessment. Sec. 10. An assessment of all the property in the
state, liable to taxation, shall be made annually in the several townships, villages
and cities thereof by the supervisors of the several townships and wards, or in
villages and cities where provision is made in the acts of incorporation or charter
for some other assessing officer, then by such assessing officer, as hereinafter
provided."
Charter of the City of Detroit, Tit. VI, c. II, § 1. "All real and personal
property within the city subject to taxation by the laws of this state shall be
assessed at its true cash value .... "
Id., Tit. VI, c. iv, § 1. "All city taxes shall be due and payable on the fifteenth
day of July in each year, and on that date shall become a lien on the property
taxed . . . [and] the owners or persons in possession of any personal property
shall pay all -taxes assessed thereon.
Id. § 7. "In case any person by agreement or otherwise ought to pay such tax,
or any part thereof, the person in possession who shall pay the same may recover
the amount from the person who ought to have paid the same, in an action of
assumpsit as for moneys paid out and expended for his benefit, or may deduct the
amount from any rent due or to become due to the person who should have paid
such tax.
Id. § 26. "On and after the twenty-sixth day of August in each year . . . the
City Treasurer shall enforce the collection of all unpaid taxes which are assessed
against the property or value other than real estate. If such taxes shall remain
unpaid the City Treasurer shall forthwith levy upon and sell at public auction
the personal property of any person refusing or neglecting to pay such tax, or
collect the same through the courts. . . . All city taxes upon personal property
shall become on said fifteenth day of July a lien thereon and so remain until paid,
and no transfer of the personal property assessed shall operate to divest or destroy
such lien.
Id. § 27. "All city taxes upon personal property . . . in addition to being a
lien upon the property assessed shall become a debt against the owner from the
time of the listing of the property for assessment, and shall remain a debt against
the owner of the property or his estate after his death, until the same are paid."
The provisions of the Charter of the City of Detroit are taken from the dis-
senting opinion of Mr. Justice Whittaker, Detroit v. Murray Corp., 355 U.S. 489,
525, n. 11 (1958).
27. Id. at 492, n. 2.
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styled "personal property taxes," the court purported to look
"through form and behind labels to substance," to the applica-
tion and practical operation of the taxes.2  They were imposed
only upon Murray Corporation and were not levied directly
against the United States or its property. 29 The court did not
consider this an effort to hold United States property account-
able, for Michigan exempted all United States public property
from taxation.,3 0 To invalidate state or local taxes by the mere
form or label of the statute would be submission to rule by empty
formalisms, the court reasoned, and the constitutionality of taxes
would then hinge upon the mere addition or omission of a few
words to the taxing statutes. 31 The taxes as applied were laid
upon the corporation as possessar of the tax-exempt property,
and the Court noted that "lawful possession of property is a val-
uable right when the possessor can use it for his own personal
benefit. '32 As taxes on possession alone they surmounted the
traditional tests of constitutionality. They were not discrimina-
tory, economically burdensome, or obstructive in relation to the
federal government. 8
In the second case 34 the United States owned an industrial
plant in Detroit, Michigan. The government leased a portion of
its plant to the Borg-Warner Corporation at a stipulated annual
rent for use in Borg-Warner's private manufacturing business.
The lease allowed Borg-Warner to deduct from the rent any taxes
paid by it under the tax act involved here or any similar statute
subsequently enacted, reserving to the government the right to
28. Id. at 492. The court cited Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 399 U.S.
54'V (1950) ; Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940).
29. 355 U.S. 489, 492 (1958).
30. 6 MICH. STAT. ANN. 7.7 (1950).
31. 355 U.S. 489, 493 (1958).
32. Ibid. Preceding the quoted sentence, the court said: "We see no essential
difference so far as constitutional tax immunity is concerned between taxing a
person for using property he possesses and taxing him for possessing property he
uses when in both instances he uses the property for his own private ends. Nor
have we been pointed to anything else which would bar a State from taxing pos-
session in such circumstances." The court analogized this tax to one on the
storage of gasoline by a corporation for the United States, sustained in Esso Stand-
ard Oil Co. v. Evans, 345 U.S. 495 (1953). The tax in that case was measured
by the quantity of government gasoline stored, while the tax here was measured
by the value of the property possessed. The court observed that "a tax on stor-
age is not intrinsically different from a tax on possession, at least where in both
instances the private party is holding the property for his own gain."
33. 355 U.S. 489, 494-495 (1958). In his dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter made a chart-type comparison of the circumstances and facts of the
instant case with those of United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944),
and could see no material distinction. He regarded the tax as one on federal prop-
erty, rather than on possession. Id. at 500-502.
34. United States v. Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958).
1959] 483
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contest the validity of such taxes. The Michigan statute in ques-
tion taxed a private party using tax-exempt real property in a
business conducted for profit to the same extent as though he
owned the property.3 5 A tax was assessed against Borg-Warner
measured by the value of the federal property leased at the rate
used for calculating real property taxes. On appeal by Borg-
Warner and the United States, the Supreme Court held that a
private party using tax-exempt federal real property in its pri-
vate business may be subjected constitutionally to taxation to
the same extent as if he owned the property.
The Court considered that its decision fell within the frame-
work of principles of intergovernmental tax immunity enun-
ciated in McCulloch v. Mtryland and followed in the significant
decisions on this subject. It expressly reaffirmed and adhered
to those principles, 6 including the propositions that taxes are
not invalid merely because part or all of the economic burden of
the taxes rests upon the government and that taxes which dis-
criminate against the government or persons with whom it deals
are unconstitutional. 37 The tax in question was not discrimina-
tory. A weighty consideration for sustaining the tax was its na-
ture or character. Analogizing it to a use tax,3 8 the Court char-
acterized it as a privilege tax for the beneficial use of tax-exempt
35. 6 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 7.7(5). "Taxation of exempt real property used pri-
vately in connection with business conducted for profit; exceptions. Section 1.
When any real property which for any reason is exempt from taxation is leased,
loaned or otherwise made available to and used by a private individual, associa-
tion or corporation in connection with a business conducted for profit, except where
the use is by way of a concession in or relative to the use of a public airport,
park, market, fair ground or similar property which is available to the use of
the general public, shall be subject to taxation in the same amount and to the
same extent as though the lessee or user were the owner of such property: Pro-
vided, however, That the foregoing shall not apply to federal property for which
payments are made in lieu of taxes in amounts equivalent to taxes which might
otherwise be lawfully assessed or property of any state-supported educational in-
stitution.
§ 7.7(6) "Same; manner of assessment and collection; taxes not to become
lien; recovery in assumpsit.
"Sec. 2. Taxes shall be assessed to such lessees or users of real property and
collected in the same manner as taxes assessed to owners of real property, except
that such taxes shall not become a lien against the property. When due, such
taxes shall constitute a debt due from the lessee or user to the township, city,
village, county and school district for which the taxes were assessed and shall be
recoverable by direct action of assumpsit."
36. 35 U.S. at 472-473. See Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941);
James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937).
37. The court was impressed by the fact that any taxes due under the statute
were the personal obligation of the private lessee or user. The owner was not
liable for their payment, nor was the property itself subject to any lien if they
remained unpaid. Id. at 469. The court observed: "The class [of taxpayers]
defined is not an arbitrary or invidiously discriminatory one." Id. at 473.
38. Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
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property, as distinguished from a tax on the property itself,
measured by the value of the government property used. The
choice of beneficial use as a subject for taxation is clearly per-
missible.39 Numerous cases have confirmed the proposition that
a state may measure a tax imposed on a valid subject of state
taxation by taking into account government property which is
itself tax exempt.
40
In the third case4 ' the United States owned a manufacturing
plant at Muskegon, Michigan. Continental Motors Corporation
was granted a right to use the plant in performing several sup-
ply contracts with the government. Use of the plant was to be
rent-free, but Continental Motors agreed not to include any part
of the cost of the facilities in the price of goods supplied. The
Township of Muskegon assessed a tax against Continental Mo-
tors for its use of tax-exempt property in its private business
measured by the value of the exempt property used.42 The court
held that local taxation of a user of tax-exempt federal property
under a permit to use the property in performing contracts With
the government is constitutional.
This case differs factually from the preceding one in two re-
spects: (1) Continental Motors used the property under a "per-
mit" instead of a formal lease, and (2) Continental Motors used
the property in performing contracts with the government in-
stead of its private business. 43 Whether the party using the
property was designated a "lessee" or not was believed to be im-
material to the result. The Court reasoned that to decide the
opposite would rest tax immunity upon a mere stroke of the
draftsman's pen. The crux of the Court's opinion, however, was
its conclusion that the use of the property in performing govern-
ment contracts was not a controlling factor, for Continental Mo-
tors was still using the property in its own private enterprise,
which, at the moment, happened to be selling goods to the United
States. Even in the presence of the generous "permit" arrange-
39. 1bid.; Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Evans, 345 U.S. 495 (1953) ; Curry v.
United States, 314 U.S. 14 (1941) ; Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U.S. 86
(1934) ; Edelman v. Boeing Air Transport, Inc.,*289 U.S. 249 (1933).
40. See, for example, Pacific Co. v. Johnson, 285 U.S. 480 (1932); Educa-
tional Films Corporation of America v. Ward, 282 U.S. 379 (1931) ; Plummer v.
Coler, 178 U.S. 115 (1900) ; Home Insurance Co. of New York v. State of New
York, 134 U.S. 594 (1890).
41. United States v. Township of Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484 (1958).
* 42. The tax statute involved in this case was the same statute at issue in
United States v. Detroit, supra notes 34 and 35.
43. The court said: "We do not believe that either fact compels a different
result." 355 U.S. at 486.
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ment and the supply contracts, there was still an absence of
those elements of control or assimilation that would make Con-
tinental Motors a servant, activity, or instrumentality of the
United States Government."4
Evaluation of the effect of these later decisions on the doc-
trine of implied governmental tax immunity is complicated by
the array of dissenting and concurring opinions. The Detroit v.
Murray Corporation decision caused most of the dispute.45 The
dissenters argued strongly that this was an ad valorem tax on
the property of the government without purporting to segregate
the value of the leasehold estate from the government's estate in
fee.46 "In effect ... the dissenters equate the measure of the tax
with the subject of the tax ... [but] the Court finds that the
Government's property here was simply the measure, and not the
subject matter, of a tax which was in effect imposed on the priv-
ilege of possessing property used for private gain. '47 (Emphasis
added.)
The subject of a property tax is the property taxed. In excise
taxes it is the activity, event, privilege, or specific property right
taxed, while the income accrued or received is the subject of an
income tax. The measure of a tax is the base, value, or yardstick
to which the tax rate is applied. For example, the subject of a
real property tax is the real property, and the measure of the
tax is the value of the property. The subject of sales taxes,
which are excise taxes, is the making of a sale or the privilege of
making a sale, and the measure is the sale price of the object
sold.48 According to the current and apparently settled applica-
tion of the intergovernmental immunity doctrine, tax-exempt
federal property cannot be made the subject of a state tax.49 The
same property, on the other hand, may be used as the measure of
a tax on a properly segregated subject. Whether the chosen tax
subject is a proper, i.e., constitutional, one is a frequently de-
44. Ibid.
45. The court split five to four in Detroit v. Murray Corporation, 355 U.S.
489 (1958) ; and seven to two in United States v. Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958),
and United States v. Township of Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484 (1958).
46. See dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Whittaker in United States v. Detroit,
355 U.S. 466, 482-483 (1958).
47. Concurring and dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice, Harlan, 355 U.S. 505,
507-508.
48. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION : CASES AND MATERlIALS 17
(1952).
49. See the following cases discussed supra: Detroit v. Murray Corporatiou,
355 U.S. 489 (1958); United States v. Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958); United
States v. Township of Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484 (1958) ; United States v. Alle-
gheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944). See also cases cited in note 11 supra.
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bated-question. A much disputed issue, also, is whether the prop-
erty involved in a given case is in reality the subject or the meas-
ure of the tax. The dispute is clearly illustrated by the three
Michigan cases in which a majority of the Supreme Court recog-
nized that in the exercise of its discretion Michigan had chosen
a subject, the beneficial use of property, that was properly with-
in the state taxing power, even though tax-exempt property was
used as the measure.
When confronted by this unique issue, which had been ex-
pressly reserved in United States v. Allegheny County5 ° in 1944,
the Supreme Court indicated a willingness to continue its re-
straint on the broad sweep of immunity doctrine language and
to draw the line between the taxable and the immune with more
precision. In sustaining the taxes in the three Michigan cases
the Supreme Court stepped quite near the outer boundary of
state taxing power within the principle of intergovernmental
tax immunity. There may be merit to the argument that the
court stepped even beyond that boundary."' Certainly the readi-
ness of the Court to go beyond the language and label of a taxing
statute in one of the cases and sustain the application of an ordi-
nary personal property tax to a mere possessory interest in fed-
eral property, the legislature having included no such provision
in the statute, is questionable.52 The purported justification for
that approach is that the court is concerned with the application,
i.e., administration, of state tax statutes rather than the lan-
guage in which they are couched, for it is from their application
that controversies arise. Their practical effect and operation are
the primary considerations. Absolute precision and perfection
in statutory language are not required. This justification, how-
ever, blinds itself to the fact that when the language of a statute
designates property as its subject, without reference to beneficial
use or possessory interests, validation of its application to sub-
jects not included within its terms is tantamount to a judicial
change of labels. The judicially chosen label then is used to de-
termine constitutionality. In effect, the tax assessor's authority
is enhanced beyond that given by the legislature, and taxation
of a subject that the legislature could have taxed, but did not, is
allowed. A further effect is that the judiciary takes the initia-
tive on an issue that more properly should be reserved for legis-
50. 322 U.S. 174 (1944). Note 20 supra.
51. See Time, March 17, 1958, p. 18.
52. Note 23 aupra.
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lative decision. 5 The court is confronted by a dilemma. Its
choice must turn upon what it conceives to be a sound, realistic
analysis of the facts and application of constitutional and legal
principles.
The view one takes of these arguments must not omit consid-
eration of the crucial distinctions between the subject and meas-
ure of a tax and between private interests and governmental in-
terests. It is submitted that in drawing these distinctions the
court can make its reasoning more convincing by emphasizing
that a private possessory interest in tax-exempt property is a
form of personal property to which an ordinary personal prop-
erty tax is properly applicable. 54
Presupposing the proper application of the constitutional
doctrine of implied governmental immunity and the constitution-
ality of the taxes, sound policy factors also support the decisions
that deny tax immunity to lessees or private users of government
or other tax-exempt property. A large segment of the federal
governmental functions is conducted by contracts with individ-
uals or corporations. This is notably true of military defense
preparation. In states where the volume of government con-
tract business is large, exemption of the private interests of pos-
sessors and users of government property deprives the state gov-
ernments of significant tax revenues. The use of leases or con-
tracts to avoid a fair share of the state or local tax burden is
discouraged.
It is highly debatable whether these later decisions repre-
sent a deviation from established principles. Considering the at-
tempt to segregate and tax a proper subject, a sound conclusion
is that the intergovernmental immunity doctrine continues un-
impaired, but that its farthest boundary is more clearly marked.
The effect is that in those states where government property is
used extensively by private enterprise a new source of revenue
is now freed from uncertainty. 55
53. Note 23 supra.
54. See Kaiser Co. v. Reid, 30 Cal.2d 610 (1947) ; note 32 supra.
55. Pursuant to a new Massachusetts law, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 59, § 3D,
enacted in 1958, leasehold interests in real estate and buildings owned and leased
by the federal government in that state are now subject to taxation to the extent
permitted by Congress. The new statute was enacted to overcome a Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court decision that, although federal legislation allowed taxation
of certain leasehold interests, there was no Massachusetts statutory authority for
such taxation. Squantum Gardens v. Assessors of Quincy, 140 N.E.2d 482 (Mass.
1957). The New York Legislature sought to take advantage of this potential
source of revenue when it passed A.B. 4268 (1958), State Tax Review, March 31,
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A speculative inquiry at this point injects uncertainty into
the problem again. It raises the question whether Congress in
the exercise of its constitutional powers can make the interest
of a lessee, possessor, or user of federal property, currently con-
sidered to be within state taxing power, immune from state or
local taxes. Since the Court concluded that the beneficial use of
tax-exempt government property is a proper subject for state or
local taxation, it would seem to follow that Congress cannot pre-
clude taxation of that privilege or interest without exceeding its
constitutional limits within the dual sovereignty principle.
Whether it follows or not depends upon the effect of an inter-
play of constitutional propositions.
Laws made pursuant to the Constitution are the supreme law
of the land.5 6 Under the "necessary and proper" clause of the
Constitution Congress has broad power to make laws in execu-
tion of the powers and authority vested in the United States.
57
Congress has power also to make all needful laws for the regula-
tion and disposition of its territories, possessions, and property. 8
State constitutions and laws in conflict with congressional laws
cannot stand. Congress can choose the means by which its laws
shall be administered. 9 Federal instrumentalities, activities, and
functions created by Congress pursuant to the Constitution are
immune from state interference by taxation or other means with-
out congressional authorization." If Congress chooses to execute
federal functions through a contractor or lessee as an "instru-
mentality," "activity," or "agent," the states are powerless to
tax them unless Congress waives immunity. Relevant circum-
stances, legislation, or the contractual relationship may place the
contractor or lessee in one of those immune categories. The ques-
tion whether this situation exists must be considered by the
court in each case. Nevertheless, there are federal activities
which in the absence of specific congressional consent may be
affected by state regulations 6 '1 The primary question here, how-
1958, p. 1; but a gubernatorial veto prevented its becoming law, State Tax Re-
view, April 28, 1958, p. 1. The Ohio Supreme Court recently held that although
the United States consented to state taxation of a party to whom it had leased
a housing project, Ohio law did not provide for a tax on leasehold interests. Frank-
lin County v. Lockbourne Manor, Inc., 154 N.E.2d 147 (Ohio 1958).
56. U.S. CONST. art. VI, par. 2, quoted in note 3 supra.
57. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
58. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, the "necessary and proper" clause; McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
60. Cases cited in notes 13 and 24 supra.
61. Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 446 (1943) ; Standard Dredging Cor-
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ever, is whether Congress may simply extend the federal cloak
of immunity over lessees or others who are not "instrumentali-
ties," "activities," or "agents," without regard for the subject
of the tax, merely because the government deals with them. Lan-
guage in some decisions supports an affirmative answer. Per-
haps Congress will not take such action, but, if it does, it is sub-
mitted that the probable answer by the Court will favor congres-
sional power. In the words of Mr. Justice Black, "this is not to
say that Congress, acting within the proper scope of its power,
cannot confer immunity by statute where it does not exist con-
stitutionally. . . . Such complex problems are ones which Con-
gress is best qualified to resolve."62
In an era of extensive federal activity the Supreme Court is
reluctant to inhibit the taxing power of the states. This power
must be exercised carefully within the bounds of the principle
of implied intergovernmental immunity. When state taxes tend
to affect federal governmental operations or interests, close scru-
tiny is in order. Levying upon purely private interests is indis-
pensable to their constitutionality in the absence of a congres-
sional waiver of immunity. If the state has separated the pri-
vate interest from the governmental interest in federal property
and imposed its tax upon the private interest alone, the tax will
be sustained, even though the economic burden or other effect of
the tax is ultimately borne by the federal government. An addi-
tional, but narrow, path for avoiding the snares of the immunity
doctrine has been charted for the states. For some it means in-
creased revenue - for others, interesting theory. The extent of
future utilization of this approach by the states cannot be fore-
cast, 3 but in the absence of possible congressional prohibition a
new taxing technique has been opened to them.
Thomas A. Self
poration v. Murphy, 319 U.S. 306 (1943) ; Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S.
1 (1941); California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109 (1941).
62. United States v. Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 474 (1958). See Oklahoma Tax
Commission v. Texas Company, 336 U.S. 342 (1949) ; Smith v. Davis, 323 U.S.
111, 116-119 (1944); Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 446 (1943); Oklahoma
Tax Commission v. United States,,319 U.S. 598, 606-607 (1943) ; Maricopa County
v. Valley Bank, 318 U.S. 357, 361 (1943) ; James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302
U.S. 134, 160-161 (1937).
63. See note 55 supra.
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